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Electric Vehicles (EVs), like all modern vehicles, are entirely controlled by electronic devices
embedded within networks that are exposed to the threat of cyberattacks. Cyber vulnerabil-
ities are magnified with EVs due to unique risks associated with EV battery packs. Current
batteries have well-known issues with specific energy, cost and fire-related safety risks. In
this study, we develop a systematic framework to assess the impact of cyberattacks on EVs.
While the current focus of automotive cyberattacks is on short-term physical safety, it is cru-
cial to consider long-term cyberattacks that aim to cause financial losses through accrued
impact, especially in the context of EVs. Faulty components of battery management systems
such as a compromised voltage regulator could lead to cyberattacks that can overdischarge
or overcharge the battery. Overdischarge could lead to failures such as internal shorts in the
timescale of minutes through cyberattacks that compromise energy-intensive EV subsystems
like auxiliary components. Attacks that overcharge the pack could shorten the lifetime of a
new battery pack to less than a year. Further, such attacks also pose physical safety risks via
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the triggering of thermal (fire) events. Attacks on auxiliary components lead to battery drain,
which could be up to 20% of the state-of-charge per hour. Lastly, we develop a heuristic for
the stealthiness of a cyberattack to augment traditional threat models. The methodology pre-
sented here will help in building the foundational principles of electric vehicle cybersecurity:
a nascent but critical topic in the coming years.
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Modern vehicles consist of a myriad of devices and systems ranging from safety-critical
systems that control a vehicle’s brakes to auxiliary components that adjust cabin temperature and
wiper speed. While such components enhance the users’ safety and comfort, they also render the
vehicle’s internal networks vulnerable to cyberattacks. When these vulnerabilities are exploited,
attackers can gain access to safety-critical systems like the brakes and transmission of the vehicle,
as demonstrated by recent work.1, 2
Alongside, another notable development in the automotive sector is the transition to electric ve-
hicles (EVs) motivated by efforts to downscale tailpipe emissions.3, 4 Widespread EV adoption is
bottlenecked by limited driving range, battery pack cost, battery lifetime and safety issues associ-
ated with Li-ion batteries.3, 5–7 The battery pack also forms a significant fraction of the total cost of
the electric vehicle (∼20% of the cost).8, 9 From the standpoint of automotive cybersecurity, while
the primary focus is on immediate safety concerns, EV battery packs present several new vulner-
abilities related to the bottlenecks mentioned previously. It is crucial to explore the cybersecurity
aspects of battery packs to inform and improve future work in EV cybersecurity.10
One of the challenges in assessing systems involving batteries is to accurately analyze the complex
molecular-scale processes occurring inside a closed system.11–13 A practical battery system stores a
fixed amount of energy via reversible electrochemical reactions. During normal operation, several
unwanted side reactions also occur, which eventually degrade the battery’s ability to store energy
and thus, reduce the lifetime.14–20 Further, from a safety standpoint, batteries have a specified set
of conditions for safe operation, outside which the risk of thermal events increases. Cyberattacks
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Figure 1: A pictorial illustration of various potential attack scenarios. The illustration enumerates
all the variables that need to be considered for analyzing the impact of cyberattacks, which could
cause (i) Physical and/or (ii) Financial impact. The attacker could utilize auxiliary components
within the EV or EV charging systems using the attacker’s control dimensions. Cyberattacks can
cause either temporary effects or permanent damage. The only environmental state variable of
relevance in this scenario is the ambient temperature. The different variables that define the state
of the battery pack influence the magnitude of impact due to the cyberattack. (The automobile
outline illustration is published with permission from Chris Philpot.)
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may compromise driving range by draining energy via higher loads, reduce lifetime by enhancing
side reactions, and compromise safety by pushing the operating conditions to unsafe limits, as
illustrated in 1.
Attack Scenarios: The attack scenarios for an EV are centered around an attacker who aims to
cause either physical or financial losses through cyberattacks. Modern vehicles, including EVs,
contain several devices called Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that are responsible for a majority
of vehicle’s functions. ECUs gather sensor inputs and actuate mechanical and electromechanincal
components within the vehicle.1 Recent efforts that have demonstrated vulnerabilities in automo-
tive networks, have primarily examined vehicles that employ the Controller Area Network (CAN)
communication protocol. CAN is the prevailing standard for intra-vehicle communication due to
low cost and robustness; however, there are many CAN exploits.1 An attacker can gain access to
the vehicle’s CAN networks via direct physical access 1, 21 or the remote exploitation of an ECU
with existing direct access.2 If an attacker aims to cause financial impact, one attack trajectory
could be reducing the lifetime of the battery pack by enhancing the rate of degradation. In terms of
physical damage, cyberattacks could increase the risk of thermal runaway where the attacker can
overcharge or overdischarge the battery pack which are achieved through attacks on the battery
management systems (BMS) when used in conjunction with other parasitic loads like auxiliary
component loads.
In this work, we develop a physics-driven approach which uses an experimentally validated battery
model22 within a vehicle dynamics model to simulate the operation of an EV.23, 24 We also explore
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new concepts like ‘stealthiness of attacks’ and the trade-offs between stealthiness of attack and
extent of damage from the attack. Using this framework, we quantify the impact of cyberattacks
in different scenarios. We analyze either financial and physical losses incurred through either: (i)
permanent damage, defined as a change in the state of system that is irreversible, for example,
irreversible capacity loss in a battery pack and (ii) temporary damage, defined as a change in
the state of system that is (mostly) reversible, for e.g., reduction in state-of-charge which can be
recovered by re-charging.
Permanent Damage: As we stated previously, cyberattacks can accelerate cell degradation
and shorten the lifetime of the battery pack. Experimental demonstration of degradation is typi-
cally indirect as batteries are closed systems and measuring the internal states of the batteries is
extremely difficult.25, 26 Thus, a validated physics-based model that can track the internal states of a
battery packs provides a convincing means to demonstrate permanent damage due to cyberattacks.
Among the different mechanisms that cause cell degradation, two main processes of interest are:
(i) growth of the solid-electrolyte interphase (SEI) layer at the graphite anode and (ii) lithium
plating.14, 16–18, 20, 27 The SEI layer grows as a result of solvent reduction at the anode-electrolyte
interface and consumes Li+ ions, thereby causing a decrease in the amount of active Li+ ions
available and a reduction in capacity. Plating of Lithium at the anode similarly leads to a loss in
capacity along with an increase in the risk of internal shorts which could lead to catastrophic safety
issues.28–30
The permanent damage due to a cyberattack can be quantified using the rise in the internal resis-
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tance of the cell. The rise in the internal resistance is estimated using the increase in the thickness
of the SEI layer.27, 31 The extent of Li-plating is controlled by the electrochemical potential for
lithium deposition or the ‘Li-plating potential’.16 The EV battery pack end-of-life is characterized
by degradation in capacity to 80% of the initial capacity.32, 33 We define the usable 20% of the
capacity as the ‘vital capacity’ of the battery pack. A parametric study of the effect of different
variables on degradation is compiled in the Supplementary Information.
Compromised Battery Management Systems, Overdischarge: When a BMS is compromised,
an override of the lower cut-off voltage is possible.34 An attack on an EV with a depleted battery
pack and compromised BMS can lead to overdischarge through energy-intensive auxiliary compo-
nents. In terms of such cyberattacks occurring on an EV with the depleted battery pack, the idea
of using wake-up functions as attacks has been demonstrated recently.35 Such attacks could be fol-
lowed by auxiliary component attacks discussed in this work, to overdischarge the cells. During
overdischarge, the initial stages involve the decomposition of the SEI layer which is composed
of Lithium containing compounds and subsequently Copper dissolution from the current collector
begins.36 The dissolved Copper ions eventually lead to deposition of metallic Copper and potential
internal shorts. The time for potential failure can be estimated using the time required for the de-
composition of the SEI layer during the cyberattack, as shown in (Fig. 2). The cells shown in (Fig.
2) correspond to that of a 100 kWh battery pack based on NCA
(Ni0.8Co0.15Al0.05O2) cathode and Graphite anode. The thickness of the SEI layer is a func-
tion of the age of the battery pack where 50nm is assumed to be equivalent to a battery pack aged
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Figure 2: A compromised battery management system, is vulnerable to attacks that override the
lower voltage cutoff which can overdischarge the pack. During overdischarge, one of the initial
steps is the decomposition of the Li-ion containing SEI layer which is followed by the dissolution
of copper ions from the current collectors, with the possibility of internal shorts and other safety
events. The estimated time to the onset of copper dissolution occurs during overdischarge is shown
above for the cells based on NCA (Ni0.8Co0.15Al0.05O2) cathode and Graphite anode. For compo-
nents with the power consumption equivalent to lights (∼200 W), the time to onset of copper dis-
solution is under 2 hours while components with a high power consumption like air-conditioning
have a timescale of less than an hour.
over 2 years, however, the thickness would change with the vehicle operating conditions. We ob-
serve that attacks that involve components with an energy consumption rate of over 200W, the
timescale for the complete decomposition of the SEI layer and potential failure is under 2 hours.
While the consequences of overdischarge in Li-ion batteries depend on the kind of materials used
in the cells, the impact could range from the loss of energy through the internal short to thermal
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and safety events as well.34, 36
Compromised Battery Management Systems, Overcharge: A compromised BMS can modify
the upper cut-off voltage.37 The pack can then be charged at a voltage higher than the normal
charging voltage (manufacturer specific upper voltage cutoff) leading to overcharging. Within a
constant current-constant voltage protocol,38 an increase in the charging current would lead to
an increased rate of degradation which is an extension of the previously mentioned parametric
analysis on the discharge rate of the battery pack. However, overcharging the battery pack leads to
various other issues shown in (Fig. 3).
In (Fig. 3a), we observe a super-linear rise in the growth rate of ∆R∗ as the overvoltage per cell
increases in a fresh cell. The charging system cyberattack simulated spans a duration of one hour
after charging similar to the auxiliary component cyberattacks. However, the consequent damage
caused to the battery pack in terms of capacity fade, as shown in (Fig. 3b), is enormous. At a
cell overvoltage of 0.4V, we observe that the pack reaches its end-of-life or 100% damage to vital
capacity in about 200 days. This could result in significant financial impact as shown in (Fig. 3b)
where we estimate the monetary value of the loss of capacity for a 100kWh battery pack assuming
the cost of battery packs of about $200/kWh.40 (Fig. 3a) also shows the decrease in the Li-plating
potential which implies that lithium would plate more readily at higher overvoltage. Over time,
such attacks could lead to an increased amount of Li-plating which could have safety implications
resulting in physical impact including thermal events and fire.28, 41
Compromised Auxiliary Components: Compromised auxiliary components effectively act as
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Figure 3: The impact of cyberattacks on charging systems specifically aimed at overcharging the
battery pack is summarized here.(a) The attacks studied here lasts for one hour after charging.
We can study the increase in the SEI growth rate and ∆R∗.(b) This increase along with Li-plating
translates to capacity fade and could shorten the lifetime to about 200 days at an overcharge voltage
of about 0.4V. The reduction in the Li-plating potential due to overcharge in (Fig. 3a), provides a
metric to quantify the risk of developing internal shorts due to lithium plating.39 When the same
attacks are performed on older packs, we observe that the ∆R∗ growth rate increases while the
Li-plating potential decreases, both of which are detrimental to the state-of-health of the battery
pack.
parasitic loads. Quantifying the impact of such attacks requires a close examination of different
operating and environmental variables. The variations in each of the state variables like tempera-
ture, state-of-charge (SOC), pack size, age of the pack, etc. and the set of variables that defines a
given auxiliary component attack workload42–44 affects the degradation in vital capacity in a dif-
ferent manner. A parametric analysis of all the variables, exploring the effect of each variable,
similar to other studies17, 18 reveals that the damage to vital capacity increases with the tempera-
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ture by following the Arrehenius relationship which implies that cyberattacks conducted at higher
ambient temperature would cause greater impact. Damage to vital capacity also increases with
the State-of-Charge of the battery pack which suggests that attacks on fully charged battery packs
would cause more damage. As the age of the pack increases, the damage caused by a fixed load
in the same conditions decreases. The damage to vital capacity is seen to be a sub-linear function
of the total time of attack, characteristic of a diffusion-limited process. Further, damage to vital
capacity increases linearly with an increase in the cumulative energy consumption of the load, a
phenomenon which has been covered previous studies on capacity fade.17, 18
Following the insights from the parametric analysis, we infer that attacks which comprise of energy
intensive auxiliary components when engaged after a new battery pack is fully charged cause
the most damage. We design the attack scenarios accordingly. We consider two types of EV
users based on charging behavior, either charging at ‘Home’ or charging at ‘Home’ and at ‘Work’.
The sample attack workload spans a duration of one hour and is based on the combination of
A/C at high power along with Lights, Power-Steering and Wipers. We analyze the cases where
these users are located in Oslo, San Francisco, Beijing, Delhi and Phoenix which serve as proxies
for the environment state variable of temperature and are chosen to represent a wide range of
temperature conditions. In order to analyze the impact of auxiliary component cyberattacks, we
use ∆R, a quantity which represents the increase in internal resistance of the cell compared to a
cell which has not been subjected to the attack workloads. ∆R essentially provides information
on the effectiveness of the cyberattack. We calculate ∆R after 400 days for each case using the
11
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Figure 4: We can study the impact of auxiliary component cyberattacks here, based on the results
for simulations equivalent to ∼400 days. ∆R∗ represents the increase in the resistance of the cell
due to the cyberattack when compared to the baseline scenario. The triangular markers indicate
situations where the vehicle is attacked twice in a day. In such cases, the average ∆R∗ of the two
attacks is shown, while the circular markers represent the cases with one attack over the day.
following relationship,
∆R =
RASEI − RBSEI
RBSEI
, (1)
where RSEI is the resistance due to the SEI layer, and ‘A’ and ‘B’ represent the attack and baseline
scenario. For the quantities reported in (Fig. 4), ∆R∗ values are obtained by normalizing all the
∆R values with the minimum value in a given set which facilitates the comparison of values within
the set.
In (Fig. 4), the rise in ∆R∗ is the most for Oslo, which has the lowest average ambient temper-
ature. While an increase in ambient temperature causes an increase in the thickness of the SEI
layer, the resistance due to the formation of SEI layer impedes further growth.45 This phenomenon
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leads to the fact that places like Phoenix, where the ambient temperature is high, already feature a
substantial SEI layer thickness, thereby minimizing any additional damage to vital capacity due to
the attack workload. However, it is worth highlighting that the average resistance due to the SEI
film formed is higher in warmer regions compared to colder regions. The two cases of charging, at
Home and at Work, do not show any substantial difference, although, if the EV is charged in both
locations, then we have two separate time windows for attack.
Temporary Damage: With compromised auxiliary components, attack workloads can cause
a depletion of energy contained in the battery pack, thereby a reduction in available driving range.
This damage can be reversed by charging the battery pack. However, such attacks can play into
the well-known issue of ‘range anxiety’.3 For some vehicles, with battery packs <40kWh battery
packs, up to 20% of the available range could be depleted in under one hour with energy intensive
attack workloads which include combinations of auxiliary components as discussed previously.
Such attacks which engage several components at the same time will be more energy intensive
compared to single components, however, such attacks might be easier to detect for the user which
is discussed in the subsequent sections.
Stealthiness of Attack: An important constraint on a cyberattack is the likelihood of it getting
detected. In the case of auxiliary components, the detection is by the user and hence it is difficult
to develop a quantitative metric for the same. However, in order to provide a basic overview of the
issue, we develop a qualitative understanding using three scenarios, namely, ‘parked’, ‘stationary’
(at rest within driving operation) and ‘driving’. A summary of the stealth of an attack involving a
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Table 1: Stealthiness of attack, a qualitative metric used by attackers to reduce the chance of
detection.
Auxiliary Component
Stealthiness of Attack
Parked Stationary Driving
A/C-High High Low Medium
A/C-Low High High High
Power Steering N/A High High
Lights High Low Medium
Fan High Low Medium
Wipers Medium Very Low Very Low
Combinations High Low Low
given auxiliary component is given in (Tab. 1). Such a metric is heuristic but it provides a calibra-
tion for the components that are more likely to be targeted based on the attacker’s perspective. An
auxiliary component that involves a high stealthiness of attack and is also energy intensive would
naturally be targeted often.
Rowhammer Attack: Rowhammer style attacks46 have been demonstrated previously where
targeted workloads on memory systems were generated to cause corruptions which can be used
to launch further attacks. We observe an analogous case here with battery systems since battery
pack is made up of several cells arranged in a matrix involving a series-parallel configuration. This
architecture is vulnerable to ‘rowhammer’ attacks since individual strings or cells within battery
packs could be targeted through a compromised battery management system and the damage to
individual strings or cells is magnified. Each of the cyberattack scenarios we have considered, like
attacks on auxiliary components, overcharge, and overdischarge could be orchestrated as rowham-
mer attacks. We previously discussed the various factors due to which the damage to the battery
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pack increases with a reduction in pack size for the same workload which is especially relevant
to rowhammer attacks. Such attacks could not only shorten the lifetime of the targeted subset of
the battery pack but could also lead to issues related to instabilities due to the isolation of strings
within the battery pack.
We have discussed the potential physical and financial impact due to cyberattacks on EVs and EV
subsystems. We identify simple but effective cyberattacks on auxiliary components that can tem-
porarily drain the battery pack up to 20% per hour. Furthermore, we analyze attacks could lead to a
deterioration in the power capability due to an increase in the cell resistance. We use a metric which
is equivalent to the ‘normalized resistance increase’, which can be used to quantify the extent of
performance reduction. We find that normalized resistance increase is generally higher for colder
regions. We find that cyberattacks on auxiliary components launched after the pack is completely
charged (i.e. high state-of-charge) leads to more damage. The cell resistance increase, largely
due to the formation of a solid-electrolyte-interphase (SEI) layer, follows a sublinear relationship
with time. This results in a new pack being more vulnerable than an aged pack to cyberattacks on
auxiliary components. Compromised battery management systems expose the pack to two kinds
of attacks, (i) Overdischarge and (ii) Overcharge. Overdischarge attacks which override the lower
cutoff voltage of the pack could lead to the complete decomposition of the SEI layer in under two
hour thorough auxiliary components with a power rating of over 200W. The decomposition of the
SEI is followed by the dissolution of Copper ions which could eventually lead to internal shorts
and potential safety events. Cyberattacks launched during charging through the compromise of the
voltage regulator could lead to an overcharge of the cells, which in some cases could even lead to
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physical safety issues (e.g. fire). Further, this could lead to a new pack being depleted to 80% of
its initial capacity (end-of-life for an EV battery) in less than a year. Finally, a compromise of the
battery management system could lead to novel “rowhammer"-style attacks (attacking a string of
cells), which could damage a subset of cells in a short time span. We believe that the results pre-
sented here will inform the development of robust detection and prevention systems and provide a
much-needed rational design approach for electric vehicle automotive security.47
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Methods
Battery Pack Simulations. The description of the system of equations for the multiphysics bat-
tery model16, 22 can be found elsewhere. Cells constructed based on this modelling framework are
assembled into a battery pack model. The baseline load profile for the vehicle is based on Urban
Dynamometer Driving Schedule for 50 miles per day, along with a constant current-constant volt-
16
age (CC-CV) charging protocol with a peak power of a level-1 charger. The attack workloads are
implemented within this daily load profile. The daily load profiles are repeated to simulate the
operation over a long period. The battery model is a thermally coupled model,22 and the ambient
temperature conditions are implemented within the same simulation framework, described in detail
in the Supporting Information.
Supporting Information (SI): Supporting Information contains details of the parametric study for
battery degradation and other information on the battery modeling undertaken for the study.
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Battery Modeling
These equations used for the battery modeling are summarized by Fang et al.,1 and Kalupson
et al.,2 using Eqns. (1-5) which describe the 1-D transport model for the species and the
charge coupled with a lumped thermal model. The solid phase charge conservation is given
by
∇.(σeff∇Φs) = jLi, (1)
where σeff is the effective electronic conductivity and Φs is the potential of the solid phase.
The electrolyte phase charge conservation is given by
∇.(keff∇Φe) +∇.(keffD ∇log(ce)) = −jLi, (2)
where keff is the effective ionic conductivity, Φe is the potential of the electrolyte phase, keffD
is the conductivity and ce is volume averaged Li concentration in the electrolyte phase. The
conservation of species in the electrolyte phase is given by
∂(εece)
∂t
= ∇.(Deffe ∇ce) +
(1− t0+)
F
jLi, (3)
where εe is the volume fraction, Deff is the effective diffusion coefficient, t0+ is the transference
number, and F is the Faraday constant. The species conservation in solid phase is given by
∂cs
∂t
=
Ds
r2
∂
∂r
(r2
∂cs
∂r
), (4)
where cs is the concentration of Li in the solid phase, Ds is the diffusion coefficient in the
solid phase, and ‘r’ represents the radius of the particles of active material. The energy
1
balance is represented as a lumped thermal model given by
∂(ρCpT)
∂t
= (qr + qj + qc + qe)Acell + hconvAs(k∇T), (5)
which accounts for qr reaction heat, qj the joule heating, qc the heating due to contact re-
sistance between the current collector and electrode materials, and qe the entropic heating.
The last term represents the heat dissipation, where hconv is the coefficient of heat dissipation
and As is the cell external surface area.
SEI layer and Degradation Processes
The parasitic reactions within the cell based on models that can be found elsewhere3,4 are:
jSEI = −kSEI. cssol.exp
[− αc,SEI.F
RT
.
(
φs − φe − I.RSEI − USEI
)]
, (6)
jPL = −io,PL.exp
[− αc,PL.F
RT
.
(
φs − φe − I.RSEI
)]
, (7)
where the side currents for each of the degradation processes for Solid-Electrolyte Interphase
(SEI), (jSEI), for the Lithium plating, (jPL), and the last rate equation captures the Active
Material Isolation along with the total current, (I). The other constants from the degra-
dation sub-model are the rate constants (ko,SEI = 1× 10−12 m/s)4, (kAMI = 2× 10−14m/s)
and the exchange current density, (io,PL = 0.001A/m2)4. The (α’s) are the cathodic transfer
coefficients. (cssol), is the concentration of the solvent. The (φ’s) are the potentials of the
electrode and liquid phases. (Rfilm) is the resistance of the SEI layer.
The increase in the thickness of the SEI layer increases the internal resistance or impedance
of the cell, thereby leading to a loss in the power capabilities.
dδSEI
dt
= − jSEI
2F
MSEI
ρSEI
, (8)
where MSEI and ρSEI are the molecular weight and the density of the SEI. The resistance due
to the SEI is calculated using the effective conductivity of the electrolyte (solvent) through
the SEI using:
RSEI =
δSEI
κeffSEI
, (9)
Parametric Analysis
Throughout this study, we examine capacity fade considering a quantity defined as ‘vital
capacity’ which is equivalent to 20% of the initial capacity of the battery pack. For EVs a
degradation of 20% of the initial capacity or 100% of the vital capacity marks the end-of-life
of the battery pack5. In order to examine the effect of each variable, we select a sample cyber
attack defined by a specific workload on the pack conducted for a fixed duration of time. In
2
other words, we fix all the attacker’s control dimensions and constraints. We also fix all other
battery pack and environment state variables apart from the variable in consideration, and
thereby examine permanent damage as a function of the given variable alone. For examining
permanent damage, the first variable considered for analysis is the ambient temperature. The
damage to vital capacity is observed to be an exponentially increasing function of ambient
temperature and follows the Arrhenius relationship. The parametric analysis summarized
in (Fig. S1-S4) are the results of battery pack simulations for attack workloads of one hour
comprising of A/C, Lights, Power-Steering and Wipers, for 400 attack-charge cycles. The
Constant Current Constant Voltage (CC-CV) charging protocol is followed in each of the
simulations.
The effect of ambient temperature on the damage to vital capacity is illustrated in (Fig.
S1). The damage to vital capacity follows the Arrhenius equation and within the same
analysis, on comparing different workload, we can observe the damage to vital capacity
increases linearly as a function of the average power of the workload.
The SOC along with temperature are studied to see their influence on the capacity fade
for battery packs of different age, namely 0, 1, and 2-year-old packs as visualized in (Fig.
S2). We observe that the damage to vital capacity increases with increase in SOC, in other
words, if a cyber attack is conducted on a fully-charged battery pack or a battery pack which
is placed in a higher ambient temperature, then the resultant impact would be much greater.
On comparing the SOC-Temperature results for packs of different age, we observe an
interesting trend that older packs show a much lower damage to vital capacity with the
same specified cyber attack. This can be explained from the fact that the SEI layer modeled
shows a growth rate which is a sub-linear function of time, and hence the capacity fade
or damage to vital capacity decreases for a battery which has already aged for a certain
duration.
The effect of total time-of-attack on damage to vital capacity can be seen in (Fig. S3),
where we see that the damage is a sub-linear relationship of time. The damage to vital
capacity also increases linearly with a reduction in the battery pack size. This could be
explained as capacity fade being a linear function of the depth-of-discharge, as seen in (Fig.
S4) since a smaller battery pack would have a larger depth of discharge for the same auxiliary
component or workload considered, and this corroborates the findings of other studies6.
Disabling Battery Cooling Fan
To demonstrate the feasibility of causing a thermal runaway event, we have discovered a
particular CAN message that disables the battery cooling fan for a 2009 Toyota Prius. To
discover this message, we systematically injected a CAN message with each possible ID value
ranging from 0x0 to 0x6FF, or the safe range for message injection7. For each injection, we
flood the network with a particular ID and randomly modify the data values until we notice
a physical response in the vehicle. We do acknowledge that the Prius is a Hybrid vehicle and
that it is an older model car; however, modern EVs also have their Battery ECU connected
to the CAN bus and a newer model car is much more likely to have minor systems, such
as the cooling fan, controlled by CAN messages. If we assume that the attacker is a strong
attacker (as discussed in our threat model) who can re-flash the Battery ECU, then the
attacker can simply write code that ignores the battery temperature. With the combination
3
of disabling the battery fan and forcing the ECU to ignore battery temperature, it is clear
how an attacker can cause a safety event.
Fraction of Range Reduction and the Effect of Temperature
The energy consumption per unit distance for each EV is collected from the data of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. The ambient temperature has a significant impact on
the rated range and the use of auxiliary components like heaters and air-conditioners at low
or high ambient temperatures causes an additional loss in range. The SOC is could have
an effect on the discharge efficiency of the battery pack and hence would affect the energy
consumption. An aged battery pack would have a lower pack energy, and hence a lower
overall rated range. For more details on the impact of each of these variables on short-term
impact. The loss in range is determined by the energy consumed by the auxiliary components
and the energy consumption of the vehicle at the time instant of the attack. In effect, the
fraction of range lost or the ratio of range lost due to a cyberattack and the rated range of
the vehicle would be independent of the temperature.
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Figure S1: Damage to Vital Capacity as a function of ambient temperature for various auxiliary
components, where we observe the Arrhenius type relationship. Each attack workload is run for a
time duration of one hour and then subjected to charging with the pack SOC of about 0.7.
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Figure S2: Bi-variate analysis of the Damage as a function of the SOC and ambient temperature
conducted for battery packs of different age (0,1,2 years). The attack workloads are fixed for a time
duration of one hour and then subjected to charging.
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Figure S3: Damage to vital capacity studied as a function of the total time of attack for various
auxiliary components which shows the sub-linear relationship. Each attack workload has a duration
of one hour, and the pack is then subject to charging. The initial SOC of the pack is maintained at
0.7. The inset shows the different workloads that have been simulated.
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Figure S4: Damage to vital capacity studied as a function of the energy consumption of the
auxiliary components at an ambient temperature of 40oC. The damage is calculated after 20 days
of attack where the battery pack is subjected to the attack workloads of one over and charged after.
The initial SOC of the pack is maintained at 0.7.
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Figure S5: The daily power load on the Model S P100D which shows multiple scenarios. The
power load shown in ‘blue’ represents the baseline scenario where we have no cyberattacks, and
the ‘red’ represents the attack scenario. The attack is assumed to take place only during the time-
window after charging based on the conclusions drawn from the our analyses above. The case where
the user charges only at home is illustrated in (a) while (b) is a case where the user charges both at
home and at work. The attack scenario in the work-charging case could have two distinct sub-cases
where the attack is conducted either at one or both the time-windows after charging.
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Figure S6: The fraction of rated range lost due to the cyberattack is determined using the
energy consumption per unit distance of the electric vehicle. The energy consumption changes with
temperature, where extreme (low of high) temperatures lead to an increased energy consumption.
The quantity of range reduced is calculated using the same energy consumption as the one used to
calculate the rated range, and hence the fraction of rated range lost is independent of the ambient
temperature.
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Figure S7: The temperature variations in different locations over the year used for the long-term
damage studies. The ambient temperature data for each location is incorporated as an average over
every week, and the effect of these changes in temperature can be seen in the SEI growth which is
quantified in the model.
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